ABSTRACT:

This work seeks to investigate the crucial historical disconnection about our African experience in Hegel's philosophy. It explains the concept of personality and its substance from Hegel's perspective in relation to African communalism and personality. It attempts to understand whether Hegel's conception of a person as an individual who is conscious of his freedom and what constitutes consciousness exist in Africa. The personality and liberty of Africans are exercised within the ambits of community and are not diminished. Hegel submerges personal freedom and liberty in the collective will of the state where individuals are mere appendages. Individuals become slaves to the state whose essences, freedom and self consciousness are lost. Hegel's euro-centric spirit shielded his reason from deducting other minds as Africans. This shows a method
that is ambiguous, vague and notorious in the use of words. Against this background, Hegel altered the idea of Africa as not being a category involved in the constitution of reason. Any universal philosophy that upholds full realization of freedom as Hegel's, should not lead to rational exclusions of the other. Such willful rational exclusions become questionable in a sense because they turn out to be mere irrational prejudices masquerading as rationality. In this regard, the concern for general global culture and conflict resolution for global peace become retractile and refutable.